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A requirement on the Government formally to explain the background, objectives and legal justification for
any deployment of forces authorised to use force would on the other hand oVer longer term advantages in
terms of consistency and transparency.
If provision were made for a formal declaration by the Government of legal justification, judicial review
should not be excluded, but the courts should be left to apply the common law doctrine of non-justiciability
or judicial restraint. Whether a particular use of military force is justified will normally be a question which
should be determined in an international forum and not in UK courts.
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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES IN GERMANY
1. The rules governing the deployment of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), as well as the rules
concerning Parliamentary control over such deployments, derive from three principal sources: the German
Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the case-law of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), and,
since 18 March 2005, the Bundestag Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz). In addition, the practice
of the German Parliament (Bundestag) over the past decade or so in applying the pertinent rules is also
relevant.
I. The Basic Law
2. Several provisions of the Basic Law deal with or refer to the Armed Forces. The central provision is Article
87a, which reads as follows (unoYcial translation):
Article 87a [Establishment and powers of the Armed Forces]
(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for the purposes of defence. Their numerical
strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the budget.
(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted
by this Basic Law.
(3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect
civilian property and to perform traYc control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their
defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may
also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event
the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.
(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the
Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of
Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ
the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property
and in combating organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be
discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.
3. Apart from the third and fourth paragraph of Article 87a, only Article 35 of the Basic Law does expressly
permit the use of the Armed Forces for purposes other than defence. However, Article 35 sanctions only the
domestic employment of the Armed Forces: it allows a Land to request the assistance of the Armed Forces in
cases of natural disasters or emergencies in order to support the police in combating the disaster or emergency,
and permits the Federal Government to deploy the Armed Forces in order to support the police where natural
disasters or emergencies aVect the territory of more than one Land.
4. No provision exists in the Basic Law which regulates in express terms the deployment of the Armed Forces
abroad for purposes other than defence. However, the Armed Forces have traditionally carried out purely
humanitarian activities both domestically and abroad on the basis that such activities do not involve the
exercise of governmental authority, and therefore do not constitute an “employment” or “deployment”
(Einsatz) within the meaning of Article 87a(2). In addition, the German Constitutional Court has interpreted
Article 24 of the Basic Law to permit the deployment of the Armed Forces abroad in the context of a “system
of mutual collective security”. The relevant part of Article 24 provides as follows (unoYcial translation):
Article 24 [International organisations]
(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organisations. [. . .]
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective
security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about
and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world. [. . .]
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II. The Case-law of the Constitutional Court
5. On 12 July 1994, the German Constitutional Court delivered a judgement (Bundeswehreinsatz, 90 BVerfGE
286, 106 ILR 320) in a case brought by two Bundestag parties against the German Government, alleging that
the latter violated the Basic Law by committing German troops to military operations abroad under the
auspices of NATO and the UN. Building on its earlier case-law, the Constitutional Court interpreted Article
24 of the Basic Law in the light of the legislator’s intent and subsequent developments in state practice. First,
it found, on the one hand, that the expression “system of mutual collective security” referred to in Article 24(2)
of the Basic Law covers Germany’s participation in the collective security systems established under the UN
Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, and, on the other hand, that the
authorisation granted by Article 24(2) to participate in a “system of mutual collective security” necessarily
implies an authorisation to deploy the Armed Forces within the framework of such collective security systems,
including their integration into multinational contingents as well as their use in military operations abroad.
Second, the Constitutional Court also found that, notwithstanding the general authorisation granted in
Article 24(2) to deploy the Armed Forces in the framework of collective security systems, “the deployment of
armed military forces in principle requires the prior constitutive consent of the Bundestag” (bedarf . . . der
Einsatz bewaVneter Streitkra¨fte grundsa¨tzlich der vorherigen konstitutiven Zustimmung des Bundestages).
6. In the absence of an express rule in the Basic Law to this eVect, the Constitutional Court based this second
finding on the general principle of German constitutional law whereby the “deployment of armed military
forces” requires the Bundestag’s approval. The Court deduced this general principle (also expressed in the
maxim “the German Armed Forces are a Parliamentary force”) from the legislator’s intent in drafting the
Basic Law, German constitutional traditions since 1918, and the system of Parliamentary control over the
Armed Forces and military matters set up under the Basic Law, including Parliament’s role in proclaiming a
“state of defence”. Some commentators have strongly criticised this aspect of the Bundeswehreinsatz
judgement, arguing that the Constitutional Court has ventured far into the field of law-making.
7. The Bundeswehreinsatz case left unanswered a number of key questions. In particular, the Constitutional
Court did not specify the exact scope of the principle of Parliamentary consent, nor did it suYciently clarify
the meaning of the expression “deployment of armed military forces” coined in its judgement. Consequently,
diVerences arose in academic circles and elsewhere whether, for example, the Bundestag’s consent is required
for every single deployment of the Armed Forces even where that deployment takes place on the basis of treaty
obligations already approved by Parliament. According to some commentators, purely humanitarian
operations not using military force are not caught by the principle of Parliamentary consent. A diVerent view
holds that the objectives and nature of the deployment are altogether irrelevant: as long as the military force
is in fact “armed”, the Bundestag’s consent to its deployment is necessary. Another view suggests that the
Bundestag’s consent is required only where it is likely that the troops will actually make use of armed force.
8. The Constitutional Court has attempted to clarify some of these questions in its judgement of 25 March
2003 (AWACS, 108 BVerfGE 34). In that case, a Bundestag party petitioned the Court to issue a preliminary
injunction to the eVect that the deployment in Turkey of German crews manning AWACS aircraft pursuant
to a decision of the North Atlantic Council was unconstitutional without the Bundestag’s consent to the
deployment. The Constitutional Court stated that it had to balance the principle of Parliamentary control over
the Armed Forces against the executive’s responsibility for the conduct of foreign and security policy. Since
it could not be established that the Bundestag’s rights clearly outweighed those of the Government under the
present circumstances, the Court denied the petition. In doing so the Court declared, referring to its 1994
judgement in the Bundeswehreinsatz case, that the principle of Parliamentary consent to the “deployment of
armed military forces” is premised on the historical concept of a state of war. However, in the light of the
current political conditions where wars are no longer formally declared, the progressive entanglement in an
armed confrontation must be deemed to be identical with a formal entry into war. Therefore, according to the
Court, every deployment of armed German military forces is, in principle, subject to Parliamentary approval.
9. The Constitutional Court’s judgement in the AWACS case has been understood to mean that the consent
of the Bundestag is required for all those deployments where the Armed Forces are directly and actively
involved in hostile confrontations or armed conflicts, or where it can be anticipated that they may be so
involved during a particular operation. In its judgement, the Constitutional Court held that since it could not
be anticipated from the facts known at the time that the German AWACS crews deployed to Turkey were
likely to be directly involved in hostile activities, the petition for a preliminary injunction was not manifestly
well-founded. Clearly, the abstract possibility that German soldiers could be the subject of an armed attack
does not, as such, turn an operation into one which requires the consent of the Bundestag: the possibility of
an armed attack against the State’s military may be said to exist at all times. However, exactly what factors
should be taken into account in anticipating whether a given operation may be involved in hostile engagements
abroad is an open question. For some commentators the nature of the operation and its geographical
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proximity to ongoing hostilities is decisive, while for others only a decision by the competent German
authorities to participate in military confrontation triggers the need for the consent of the Bundestag.
10. Leaving aside these questions, it is generally accepted that, in line with the case-law of the Constitutional
Court, the guarding of foreign military installations by armed German troops, the participation in
manoeuvres and military exercises, the regular contribution of seconded German staV to the work of
multinational military contingents and bodies within NATO, including participation in AWACS missions, are
not subject to the principle of Parliamentary consent. It has been suggested that military liaison activities,
humanitarian assistance missions armed for self-defence but lacking a robust mandate, and participation in
fact-finding missions or military exchange programmes likewise do not require the consent of the Bundestag.
III. Parliamentary Practice
11. Between 1994 and 2003, the Bundestag approved the deployment of the German Armed Forces in 29
instances. More than half of these deployments took place in the period after 1999. In accordance with the
Constitutional Court’s decision in the Bundeswehreinsatz case, the Bundestag’s control over the decision to
deploy armed military forces is limited to the approval or rejection of a Government request. The Bundestag
cannot introduce modifications to such requests. However, in recent practice the Bundestag has tied its
consent to the insertion of a time-limit in its authorisation to deploy German forces abroad. Thus, its consent
had to be renewed, where appropriate, at least every 12 months.
IV. The Bundestag Participation Act of 2005
12. As early as 1994, the Constitutional Court declared in the Bundeswehreinsatz case that it was the
legislator’s task to determine the manner and extent of the Bundestag’s participation in decisions to deploy
armed German military forces abroad. This task was eventually taken up by the main political parties in 2003.
Although the parties were agreed on the need to regulate the Bundestag’s participation in these matters by way
of legislation, considerable diVerences arose as to how the principle of Parliamentary consent could best be
reconciled with the principle of swift military action. The opposition parties, fearing that public discussions
in the Bundestag could jeopardise the security and feasibility of planned military operations, proposed the
establishment of a special Bundestag committee to consider Government requests to deploy German troops.
Moreover, they suggested that operations undertaken within the framework of the EU and NATO should be
approved by the Bundestag on a general, rather than a case-by-case, basis. Critics of this approach argued
that it undermined the very principle of Parliamentary consent. Ultimately, the solution adopted in the final
legislation, that is the Bundestag Participation Act of 18 March 2005 (BGBl. I, 775; for an unoYcial
translation into English, see the ANNEX), was to introduce an expedited procedure for obtaining the
Bundestag’s consent in certain circumstances.
13. The Bundestag Participation Act consist of nine articles. Article 1 defines the purpose of the Act, and
states the basic principle whereby the deployment of armed German military forces abroad requires the
consent of the Bundestag. Article 2 defines the expression “deployment of armed military forces” as a
deployment where soldiers of the German Armed Forces are involved in armed engagements, or their
involvement in an armed engagement is to be expected. Preparatory measures preceding such deployments
and certain activities, such as humanitarian assistance, are excluded from this definition, and therefore do not
normally require the Bundestag’s consent. Article 3 sets out when the Government shall submit its request for
the consent of the Bundestag and what elements that request must contain; in addition, it aYrms that the
Bundestag may only approve or reject, but not modify, the request. Article 4 creates a simplified procedure
for obtaining the Bundestag’s consent in the case of deployments of limited intensity and range. In essence,
the Bundestag is deemed to have granted its consent to a Government request to deploy troops abroad unless
within seven days of the distribution of the request as an oYcial Bundestag document a plenary discussion of
the Bundestag is called for. Article 5 provides that deployments demanding immediate action do not need the
prior consent of the Bundestag; however, the Bundestag shall be informed about the deployment in due course
and its consent must be obtained subsequently. Article 6 obliges the Federal Government to regularly inform
the Bundestag about ongoing deployments. Article 7 deals with the extension of the Bundestag’s consent to
deployments that have remained unchanged in substance since the Bundestag last authorised the deployment
in question. The procedure formulated in the second paragraph of Article 7 applies at times when the
Bundestag is not in session. Article 8 declares that the Bundestag may recall its consent. Article 9 is of a
procedural nature.
14. The Bundestag Participation Act of 2005 has generally been welcomed by commentators. As the Act is
largely based on the pertinent case-law of the Constitutional Court, its adoption has not fundamentally altered
the existing legal position. Certain aspects of the Act have nevertheless been criticised. For some
commentators, the definition of ‘deployment of armed military forces’ in Article 2, which is central to the
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operation of the entire Act, represents a missed opportunity to clarify the case-law of the Constitutional Court.
It is still unclear what considerations govern the anticipation of the involvement of German troops in an armed
engagement abroad, and thus what level of military risk the Government may take before it is required to
obtain the Bundestag’s consent. Moreover, the exceptions to the definition of “deployment of armed military
forces” are essentially indeterminate, and therefore potentially too broad. The simplified consent procedure
under Article 4, which requires the Bundestag to take action within a relatively short period of time to rebut
the presumption of Parliamentary consent, has been denounced by some as the Bundestag disfranchising itself,
while the definition in Article 4 of a “deployment of limited intensity and range” has been considered too
vague. These criticisms suggest that the adoption of the Bundestag Participation Act has not answered all of
the questions surrounding the deployment of German troops abroad, and that the Act will have to be applied
in the light of the Constitutional Court’s case-law and the Bundestag’s practice.
V. Literature
15. For further details, see D Wiefelspu¨tz, ‘Der Einsatz deutscher Streitkra¨fte und die konstitutive Beteiligung
des Deutschen Bundestages’, Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Wehrrecht (2003) 133; W Weiß, ‘Die Beteiligung des
Bundestags bei Einsa¨tzen der Bundeswehr im Ausland–eine kritische Wu¨rdigung des
Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetzes’, Neue Zeitschrift fu¨r Wehrrecht (2005) 100. Both of these articles have been
relied on in preparing the present note. For a treatment of the subject in English, see G Nolte and H Krieger,
“Military Law in Germany”, in G Nolte (ed), European Military Law Systems (De Gruyter, 2003) 337.
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ANNEX
[UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION]
ACT CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE BUNDESTAG IN THE DECISION ON THE
DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED MILITARY FORCES ABROAD (BUNDESTAG PARTICIPATION ACT)
18 March 2005
(BGBl. I 775)
Article 1 (Principle)
(1) This Act regulates the manner and extent of the participation of the Bundestag in the deployment of armed
German military forces abroad. It is without prejudice to Article 115a of the Basic Law.
(2) The deployment of armed German military forces outside the area of application of the Basic Law requires
the consent of the Bundestag.
Article 2 (Definitions)
(1) A deployment of armed military forces takes place when soldiers of the German Federal Armed Forces
are involved in armed engagements, or their involvement in an armed engagement is to be anticipated.
(2) Preparatory measures and planning do not constitute a deployment within the meaning of this Act. They
do not require the consent of the Bundestag. The same applies to humanitarian aid services and assistance
undertaken by the armed forces where weapons are carried merely for the purposes of self-defence, provided
it is not to be expected that the soldiers will be involved in armed engagements.
Article 3 (Request)
(1) The Federal Government shall submit the request for the consent of the Bundestag to the deployment of
the armed forces in a timely manner before the start of the deployment.
(2) The request of the Federal Government shall contain information, in particular, concerning:
— the mandate of the deployment,
— the operational area,
— the legal bases of the deployment,
— the maximum number of soldiers to be deployed,
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— the capabilities of the armed forces to be deployed,
— the planned duration of the deployment, and
— the envisaged costs and financing.
(3) The Bundestag may consent to the request or reject it. Modifications to the request are not permissible.
Article 4 (Simplified consent procedure)
(1) In the case of deployments of limited intensity and range, consent may be given by simplified procedure.
The Federal Government shall set out, giving reasons, the grounds as to why the impending deployment is
one of limited intensity and range. The President of the Bundestag shall transmit the request to the Chairmen
of the Parliamentary parties and to the Chairmen of the Foreign AVairs Committee and the Defence
Committee, as well as to a representative (Obleute) designated by each of the Parliamentary parties represented
in these Committees, and have the request distributed to all members of the Bundestag in the form of an oYcial
Bundestag document. Consent is deemed to have been granted unless within seven days following the
distribution of the request a Parliamentary party or five per cent of the members of the Bundestag call for a
plenary discussion by the Bundestag. Should a plenary discussion by the Bundestag be called for, the
Bundestag shall decide.
(2) A deployment is of limited intensity and range when the number of the deployed soldiers is limited, the
circumstances clearly indicate that the deployment is of limited significance and it does not entail participation
in a war.
(3) In principle, a deployment is of limited intensity and range, where
— it constitutes a reconnaissance mission which carries weapons merely for the purposes of self-
defence,
— it concerns individual soldiers who carry out their duties in allied armed forces on the basis of
exchange arrangements, or
— individual soldiers are deployed in the framework of the UN, NATO, the EU, or another
organisation implementing a UN mandate.
Article 5 (Subsequent consent)
(1) Deployments in cases requiring immediate action, which admit of no delay, do not require the prior
consent of the Bundestag. The same applies to deployments aimed at rescuing persons from situations of
special danger, provided that a public discussion by the Bundestag would endanger the life of the persons to
be rescued.
(2) The Bundestag shall be informed, in an appropriate manner, before the start and during the course of the
deployment.
(3) The request for consent to the deployment shall be submitted subsequently without delay. If the Bundestag
rejects the request, the deployment shall be terminated.
Article 6 (Duty to inform)
(1) The Federal Government shall inform the Bundestag regularly about the course of the deployments and
about developments in the operational area.
(2) In cases referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1 (simplified consent procedure), the Federal Government shall
immediately inform the competent Committees and the Obleute.
Article 7 (Extension of employments)
(1) The procedure under Article 4 shall also apply to the extension of a decision granting consent where there
are no changes to its substance.
(2) Where the Federal Government requests the extension of a deployment, the deployment shall be deemed
authorised until two days, during which the Bundestag is in session, have passed following the distribution of
the request as an oYcial document. Should the request be submitted by simplified procedure under Article 4,
it shall be deemed authorised until the expiry of the deadline defined in Article 4, paragraph 1, fourth sentence;
should a plenary discussion by the Bundestag be called for before the expiry of the deadline, then it shall be
deemed authorised until the end of the week, during which the Bundestag is in session, that follows the
discussion by the Bundestag. The period of validity of the original authorisation remains unaVected by the
regulations set out in sentences 1 and 2.
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Article 8 (Right to recall)
The Bundestag may recall its consent to the deployment of armed military forces.
Article 9 (Entry into force)
This Act comes into force on the day following its announcement.
Memorandum by Humphry Crum Ewing6
Credentials
1. The views set out in this submission are derived primarily from my practical experience in recent years as
an adviser to Opposition defence spokesmen in Parliament and, for a period, as Special Adviser to the House
of Commons Defence Committee on Defence Related Information for Parliament.7 The views also reflect my
academic studies over many years—back to my time as an undergraduate student at Oxford in the later
1950s—and my active participation in recent years in the international Defence Studies community.
2. In advising successive Opposition Defence Spokesmen in the House of Lords.8 I have been regularly
confronted with the issue of how to advise, from the point of view of an Opposition which is also an alternative
government, on the question of how far Governments should properly be expected to take Parliament into
their confidence in relation to military operations and, in particular, how far Governments should be expected
to seek explicit Parliamentary support in respect of specific actions rather than simply accounting generally
to Parliament for those actions.
Summary of Views Expressed9
3. Based on both my practical observations and my studies I am clear in my own mind that the engagement
of United Kingdom Armed Forces in military operations should remain absolutely an exercise of Prerogative
powers and should not be subject to statutory restrictions involving the approval of Parliament. I develop my
reasoning for this conclusion at <11 below.
4. I am equally clear in my judgement that there is no place for intervention by the Courts in this process. I
explain my reasons for this further conclusion at <23. At <12 to <22 I give a very brief view on the other points
on which the Committee has invited submissions.
Need for Scrupulous Accuracy in Information Provided to Parliament
5. But at the same time as I am against procedural steps to restrict, by Parliamentary process, the power of
the executive to deploy the UK’s Armed Forces I believe that it would be in accordance with general concepts
of democratic accountability if greater care were to be taken to adhere as far as possible to scrupulous accuracy
in what is said to Parliament and to the public about the likely necessity for military operations and about
their conduct.
6. In Kosovo, for instance, the gross exaggerations of battle damage claims by NATO air attacks was a matter
of particular embarrassment, as much to the Minister answering Questions as it was to the Opposition
spokesman asking them.
7. I will not repeat the observations of the Foreign AVairs Committee and of Lord Butler of Brockwell and
his panel on the information provided to Parliament and the public in advance of the invasion of Iraq. Having
carefully considered those observations and knowing much about the (unpublished) evidence that the Butler
Inquiry received I entirely endorse the criticisms the Committee and the Inquiry have reported.
8. I wholeheartedly endorse the recommendation of the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Committee that
papers presented to Parliament explaining and/or justifying decisions to take military action should be signed
oV by a Minister,10 who would, by Parliamentary convention, be responsible and accountable for the accuracy,
6 Humphry Crum Ewing is an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence & Security Studies, Whitehall (RUSI)
and was previously a Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence & International Security Studies, then at Lancaster University
(CDISS). He served in the political oYce at 10 Downing Street of (Sir) John Major as Prime Minister.
7 It was during this period that pressure from the Defence Committee led to the Inquiry and Report by the Procedure Committee on
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Treaties (HC 210 of 1999–2000).
8 The late Lords Burnham and Vivian and most recently and currently Lord Astor of Hever.
9 The views expressed in this memorandum are the writer’s own and do not represent those of RUSI, the Conservative Party or any other
organisation with which he is connected.
10 Recommendation 24 on p.5 and Para 141 of the Ninth Report 2002-03 of the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Committee The
Decision to go to War in Iraq HC 813-I.
